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In the 1990s, Chile suffered the effects of a surge in external
capital inflows that came to a sudden stop towards the end
of the decade, despite its concentration in flows considered
to be stable, implying that an appropriate composition of
capital flows is not by itself adequate protection against
capital flow volatility. The surge in capital flows responded
to push factors associated with the supply of foreign
financing that narrowed the spread between domestic and
external returns. The unremunerated reserve requirement
(known as encaje) helped to offset the push factors by
widening the spread and restraining net capital inflows,
particularly short-term, thus gaining additional room for
monetary-policy manoeuvre. An early elimination of the
encaje during the capital inflow surge would have boosted
the inflows still further, thus aggravating macroeconomic
imbalances. An intensification of the encaje, however, would
have had limited marginal effectiveness due to circumvention
and the bound imposed by short-term inflows, already close
to zero. A more effective strategy would have been to apply
the encaje on a wider basis, thus avoiding circumvention, or
to complement its application with additional restraint on
fiscal policy.
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Unrestricted liberalization of financial flows is an
orthodox economic-policy recommendation that
invokes a parallel between financial integration and its
counterpart in international trade. Nonetheless, repeated
experiences of financial crisis among developing
countries that have embraced financial openness have
raised major doubts as to the validity of this parallel.
Renowned scholars such as J. Bhagwati,1 and
prestigious publications known for their support of
liberal economic policies, such as The Economist
(2003a and 2003b), have called for a review of the
orthodoxy to acknowledge that some temporary
restrictions on financial integration are justified in the
light of practical experience. Far from promoting
financial openness as an end in itself, in recent years
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has conducted
studies projecting a more balanced attitude towards the
benefits and costs of financial integration, and has
recommended prudence in moving towards this.2 Other
authors have undertaken major studies of sudden stops
of capital inflows and of how problems arising in the
functioning of financial markets cause macroeconomic
imbalances and costly recessions.3 Without proposing
outright restrictions on capital flows, their policy
recommendations, nonetheless, imply public
intervention in the free operation of financial markets.
A growing international financial integration is
clearly beneficial only if it is compatible with the
maintenance of macroeconomic equilibria, including a
sustainable external-account position. Sudden stops of
capital inflows, and the concomitant recessions and
crises, impose major costs that may wipe out the
benefits of integration altogether. To ensure the
sustainability of the economy’s external situation, it is
essential that the trend growth of domestic aggregate
demand be kept in line with the growth of potential
gross domestic product (GDP), in order to stabilize the
current-account deficit in a sustainable range and
thereby forestall the effects of future reversals in
external financing flows.4
From 1990 through 1997, the net inflow of foreign
capital to Chile was exceptionally large, surpassing
what would be considered a sustainable level of external
financing. At the same time, real private expenditure,
which accounts for over 75% of domestic aggregate
demand, doubled as a result of a 10% annual average
growth that outstripped the expansion of public
expenditure and both actual and potential GDP. Although
this vigorous expenditure growth was to some extent
driven by national income, which grew at about 8%
per year thanks to favourable terms of trade, it also
represented a response to massive capital inflows.5
Neither monetary nor fiscal policy could have been
the origin of the explosion of private expenditure.
Escalating private expenditure led the Central Bank of
Chile to apply a relatively tight monetary policy in
which real interest rates were kept at high levels. In
fact, the real 90-day lending rate averaged 8.8% in 1990-
1997, and peaked around 15% in the first quarter of
1990.6 Moreover, as it was private expenditure that
over-expanded, fiscal policy cannot be considered as
the origin of such behaviour, especially since the growth
of tax revenue kept pace with the expansion of private
I
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1
 See Bhagwati (2003).
2
 See Kose, Prasad and others (2003).
3
 See Calvo and Reinhardt (2000), and Caballero (2003).
4
 Keeping the current-account balance within sustainable bounds
should avert the need for precipitous expenditure adjustments in
response to sudden stops in capital flows. The policy framework
defined by the Chilean authorities in the early 1990s originally
considered a current-account deficit target of between 3% and 4%
of GDP, but this was later widened to a range of 3% to 5% of GDP.
International experience shows that deficits larger than 5% of GDP
are likely to result in abrupt adjustments (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis,
2001; Milessi Ferreti and Razin, 1996).
5
 A Granger causality test provides evidence that capital flows cause
private domestic spending, but causality is rejected in the opposite
direction.
6
 The buoyancy and high level of profitability of the real economy
in the 1990s made it possible to reconcile rapid expansion of private
expenditure with high real interest rates during the period studied.
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spending. Nonetheless, fiscal spending acquired a pro-
cyclical bias, which made monetary management more
difficult and led to higher interest rates than would have
been necessary under a cyclically neutral fiscal policy.7
As a way of preventing interest-rate hikes from
attracting even larger foreign capital inflows, thereby
diluting the effect of monetary tightening and pressuring
towards currency appreciation, in June 1991 the Central
Bank imposed an unremunerated reserve requirement
(URR), also known as the encaje, on certain types of
foreign capital inflow. This formed part of a system of
regulations aimed at restricting the volume of capital
inflows and shifting their composition towards more
stable flows. These regulations, in turn, formed an
integral part of a macroeconomic policy framework based
on a crawling-band exchange-rate system, gradually
falling annual inflation targets, budget surpluses, trade
openness, open markets and a central role for the private
sector in economic activity—particularly investment.
The URR was selectively applied to certain
categories of capital inflow and consisted in a
compulsory non-interest-bearing deposit in foreign
currency to be lodged with the Central Bank for one
year, in an amount proportional to the size of the inflow
(the rate was set at 30% for most of the period of
application). This deposit created an additional cost to
external financing, the URR financial cost (CFE), thereby
discouraging external financing entering through
channels covered by the URR mechanism. The policy
was designed essentially to restrain short-term
borrowing. Between 1990 and 1996, it was strengthened
in various ways, such that the financial cost associated
with the URR peaked in the third quarter of 1996 at 350
basis points. To prevent the URR from losing
effectiveness over time, steps were taken to hinder its
circumvention through exempted channels of external
financing, with the last of such measures being
introduced in the last quarter of 1996.8 When capital-
inflow pressures eased, the URR rate was reduced to
zero in two stages in 1998, and the mechanism was
subsequently eliminated, along with the remaining
foreign capital controls, in 2001.
The unremunerated reserve requirement
represented a restriction to international financial
integration and, like any other measure of this type, it
had both benefits and costs. The controversy
surrounding the URR has generated a wide-ranging
literature, including empirical works that have attempted
to measure its effects. The URR defence has been based
on its macroeconomic-policy effects, including giving
greater room for manoeuvre to monetary policy, and
averting the amplification of the business cycle that
could result from massive but transitory external capital
inflows. Underlying this idea is the belief that the
probability of sudden stops in capital flows and the
damage they cause are likely to be lower, since the
intensity with which foreign financing is used is lower.9
Against this, the URR’s detractors claim that it was
ineffective in achieving its objectives, particularly in
regards to limiting the size of total capital flows, and
that it generated microeconomic costs by making it
harder for some local agents to obtain foreign financing
and thereby raising its cost.
The core of this paper is to study the macroeconomic
effectiveness of the URR as applied in Chile during the
1990s. It does not analyse the advisability or otherwise
of its current or future use, either in Chile or elsewhere.
Clearly, the instrument’s effectiveness is one of the key
factors to be considered when evaluating its future
application, but it is not the only one. Other relevant
considerations include the conditions of the supply of
external financing, the capacity of the economy and
local financial system to cope with the volatility of
capital flows, the legal and regulatory infrastructure
within which the URR policy would be applied, and the
limitations imposed by international treaties and other
legal instruments. In short, application of the encaje
today is a different issue, with wide-ranging
complications pertaining to each particular case; this
subject is not addressed in this paper.
Econometrics using macroeconomic data is far
from a purely objective method of analysis (even though
many of its practitioners act as if it were so), and prior
7
 Although the fiscal balance was in surplus through 1990-1997, the
elasticity of public expenditure with respect to the output cycle was
significantly positive, and similar in value to the response of public
revenues to the output cycle. Both the surplus and the procyclical
behaviour of expenditure went into reverse as from 1998, when the
economy entered a downswing; but public expenditure continued
to expand, partly compensating the slowdown in activity.
8
 An analysis of the coverage of the encaje and the way the
regulations evolved is provided in Le Fort and Sanhueza (1997).
9
 The policy strategy followed in Chile, including the regulation of
capital flows, is described in Massad (1998) and in Zahler (1996).
Studies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have viewed the
encaje as a positive factor for the stability of the financial system,
as it discourages excessive dollarization of liabilities and financial
intermediation. See Gulde-Wolf, Hoelsher and others (2003).
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beliefs play a major role in model specification.10 The
authors of this paper were directly involved in designing
the application of the URR and related measures in Chile;
and the null hypothesis of our study is that it was an
effective mechanism, despite the existence of channels
that were not covered and were used as ways to
circumvent it. A good indicator of the macroeconomic
effects of the policy is reflected in the annual revenue
obtained by the central bank from the URR (between 0.2%
and 0.3% of GDP), and in the systematic spread in favour
of assets denominated in pesos compared to those
denominated in foreign currency that was registered
while the encaje was in force.
Clearly, the URR was not entirely effective for
otherwise the excessive growth of private expenditure
would not have occurred, nor the widening of the
current-account deficit that Chile suffered by 1997. But
less-than-full effectiveness does not mean it was
ineffective or did not make a significant contribution.
In an attempt to evaluate the URR’s effectiveness, we
pose the following two questions to be answered
empirically: (i) What would have happened to capital
inflows and private spending if the URR had been
eliminated earlier at the height of the surge in capital
inflows?, and (ii) Could a more intensive application
of the URR have avoided the inflow surge and associated
macroeconomic imbalances, or should it have been
complemented with other policies?
The article is organized as follows. Section II
studies the characteristics of the surge in capital inflows,
assesses its origins, and examines the role of the URR
in absorbing foreign financing shocks, in particular,
whether the reserve requirement helped to drive a wedge
between domestic and external interest rates, thereby
giving additional room for monetary-policy manoeuvre.
Section III estimates a simple econometric model that
aims to analyse the effects of the encaje on net capital
flows and domestic demand. In particular, it studies
whether the mechanism managed to reduce capital
flows and thus helped moderate the expansion of private
spending. Section IV simulates first, the effect of
eliminating the URR in the period when the surge of
capital flows took place, and second, the different
adjustment scenarios for dealing with the surge in
inflows, including a more intensive use of the URR
supported by countercyclical fiscal policy. Section V
summarizes the main results and conclusions of the
study.11
II
Characteristics of capital flows
and external shocks
The scale of the net capital inflows that took place in
Chile between 1990 and 1997 is indicative of a long-
lasting foreign-financing shock, the so-called capital-
inflow surge, which came to a sudden stop in 1998 (see
table 1). Total net capital flows into Chile averaged more
than 7% of GDP in 1990-1997, and only 0.5% of GDP in
1999-2000. While short-term flows were highly volatile
and lacking in any clear trend, the flow of medium and
long-term capital trended upward on a sustained basis,
growing by an average of around 23% in 1990-1997;
but beginning in 1998 the capital inflow slackened in
all categories (short-, medium- and long-term). The
sudden stop was verified as total net capital flows
declined by over five percentage points of GDP in 1998
(to 4.5%) and again in 1999 (to -1.2%).12
It is broadly accepted that an economy’s
vulnerability to an interruption of external financing is
greater, the more such financing is concentrated in
short-term flows, the most volatile and least persistent
type of capital flows. Nonetheless, it has also been
10
 See Leamer (1983).
11
 Appendix A provides a glossary of the variables used in this paper;
and appendix B contains graphs tracking the behaviour of the main
variables.
12
 Short-term capital flows are the most volatile and the least
persistent category of capital flow, as measured by the autocorrelation
coefficient. See Le Fort and Lehmann (2000); however the sudden
stop affected also medium- and long-term flows, including net
foreign direct investment.
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TABLE 1
Chile: Foreign capital flows, 1990-1999
(Percentage of GDP)
Gross medium- and long-term inflows
Direct Portfolio Net short-term Medium- and long-term Total net
investment investment Loans flows outflows flows
1990 2.2 1.2 7.4 4.0 5.2 9.6
1991 2.7 0.8 4.1 1.0 5.8 1.8
1992 2.5 1.1 3.9 4.5 4.7 6.7
1993 2.9 2.7 4.4 2.9 5.9 7.1
1994 5.4 3.3 5.6 2.8 6.6 10.5
1995 5.3 1.9 5.2 0.4 9.4 3.5
1996 7.2 2.7 7.8 0.4 10.3 7.8
1997 7.3 4.8 8.2 -2.1 8.4 9.8
1998 7.3 1.8 8.3 -1.5 11.5 4.5
1999 14.8 4.7 6.2 -8.0 18.7 -1.2
Average 1990-1997 5.6 2.2 5.8 1.7 6.9 7.3
Source: Prepared by the authors using data from the Central Bank of Chile.
shown that concentrating external financing in medium-
and long-term flows does not necessarily eliminate the
risk of a sudden stop. The capital inflow surge that took
place in Chile between 1990 and 1997 was concentrated
in medium- and long-term flows, with short-term
inflows reduced to a minimum; but even so, total net
capital flows came to a halt as from 1998. Even when
using exclusively medium- and long-term external
financing a sudden stop can take place; investors
holding medium- and long-term liability positions in
foreign currency can access the foreign-exchange
markets, spot or forward,13 to hedge their exchange-
rate risk. This hedging implies the acquisition of
foreign-currency denominated assets, thus generating
short-term capital outflows that in fact originated from
medium-and long-term external liabilities.
1. Surge of capital inflows: External push or
domestic pull?
The capital inflows surge may be an endogenous
response to domestic conditions that result in a high
interest rate, which, in turn, “pulls” a heavy inflow of
external capital by demand or arbitrage conditions.14
Under this option, the widening of the spread of
expected returns between domestic and foreign assets
that result from changes in domestic macroeconomic
conditions (e.g. structural reforms that increase the rate
of return on real investment and thus raise the domestic
interest rate, or expansionary fiscal policy) attracts or
“pulls” capital into the country. The endogenous surge
involves a positive correlation between capital inflows
and the domestic interest rate, or between capital
inflows and the spread of returns between domestic and
external assets (Spread).
Spread = rc90 – (libo90 – E∏* +ss) - E[T ˆCR]
The spread of expected asset returns15 is measured
as the differential between the domestic and external
real interest rates, corrected for expectations of
devaluation and Chile’s sovereign risk ratio (calculated
on the basis of the Chilean government bond issued in
April 1999);16 rc90 is the domestic real interest rate on
13
 A unified “spot” market for foreign exchange free of restrictions
exists in Chile since early 1996, when the gradual elimination of
exchange restrictions was completed; investors are able to use this
market to acquire and remit foreign exchange abroad. Moreover, a
quite deep “forward” foreign-exchange market, in operation since
the early 1990s, has been intensively used for buying or selling
foreign exchange against Chilean pesos with delivery or
compensation at a future date.
14
 See Kruger (1998) and Le Fort (1998).
15
 The definition of the Spread is presented in the equation. Appendix
A presents additional details on the definitions and the sources of
the variables used in the paper.
16
 The sovereign spread or country risk on Chilean debt from 1992
to 1998 is estimated by splicing series representing the spread on
Chilean corporate bonds, calculated on the basis of 10-year bonds
issued by the National Electricity Corporation (Endesa/Enersis). For
the period 1985-1992, this is spliced with the risk index for Chile
calculated by Euromoney.
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90-day loans17; libo90 is the Libor rate on three-month
loans in dollars, ss is Chile’s sovereign spread, E∏* is
the expected external inflation rate represented by the
variation in the wholesale price index in the United
States, and E[T ˆCR] represents the expected real
depreciation of the Chilean peso, and is defined as the
difference between the equilibrium real exchange rate
(Soto and Valdés, 1998) and the observed real exchange
rate. Alternatively, E[T ˆCR]_2 is the expected real
depreciation assuming perfect foresight, i.e. is equal to
the observed future real depreciation. This second
measure of the anticipated real depreciation is used in
calculating the spread of actual returns (spread_2).
Alternatively, the capital inflow surge may respond
to the push of external factors not related to arbitrage
but reflecting changes in international investors’
perceptions and inclination to accept risks that cause
them to modify the composition of their portfolios.
These changes in portfolio composition modify the
general conditions of supply of external financing to
the country. Exogenous surges that result form the push
of external factors are identified by negative correlation
of capital inflows with domestic interest rates or with
the spread of asset returns. Therefore, larger capital
inflows mean a greater supply of financing from abroad,
which moderates domestic interest rates and narrows
the spread.
The surge of medium- and long-term capital
inflows in Chile mostly had an exogenous nature
(table 2). The correlations between gross medium- and
long-term capital flows on one hand, and the expected
spread of returns, actual spread of returns, and the
domestic interest rate, on the other, are all negative:
-31% with respect to the actual spread, -18% in relation
to the expected spread and -9% with the domestic
interest rate. These negative correlations are statistically
different from zero in all cases. When using the
medium- and long-term net capital flows as opposed
to the gross flows, the correlations with the spread of
both expected and actual returns are also negative and
statistically significant, being more marked in the first
case. However, the correlation of the net flows with
the real domestic interest rate is positive. The surge in
medium- and long-term capital inflows thus seems to
have been exogenously driven by external push factors,
and has been associated with reductions in domestic
interest rates and a narrowing of the expected and
effective spread between domestic and external
returns.18
Contrary to medium-and long-term capital flows,
short-term flows are positively associated with the
returns spread, and as such represent endogenous
responses to arbitrage. This type of flow is positively
correlated with the domestic interest rate (7%), and with
the spread of expected and effective returns (28% and
TABLE 2
Chile: Correlations of capital inflows and asset returns
(1990.1 to 2000.4) a/
Expected spread (spread) Observed spread (spread_ 2) Dom. interest rate (rc90)
Total net flows (FKN) -8% 11% 13%
(4.22) (5.57) (5.98)
Net short-term flows (FKNCP) 28% 19% 7%
(0.46) (0.48) (0.02)
Gross medium- and long-term flows -18% -31% -9%
(5.10) (6.28) (7.95)
Net medium- and long-term flows (FKM&LP) -38% -8% 5%
(3.76) (4.93) (6.11)
Source: Prepared by the authors using data from the Central Bank of Chile.
a/
 Figures in parentheses correspond to t-statistics.
17
 Loans denominated in UFs, a widely used unit of account that has
a daily adjusted value in Chilean pesos indexed to the CPI.
18
 These results, obtained on the basis of simple correlations, are
also reflected in the multiple regressions reported in the following
section for total net capital flows and net short-term flows. The spread
of expected returns appears as a statistically significant attractor for
short-term flows only.
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32% respectively); but in neither case is the positive
correlation statistically significant.
A possible link between external shocks on foreign
financing and domestic aggregate demand should not
come as a surprise. The most widely recognized
transmission mechanism for external shocks to Chile
arises from the effect of the world business cycle on
commodity prices and thus Chile’s terms of trade. But
there is also a second channel for the transmission of
external shocks, the supply of foreign financing. The
results of the causality analysis are presented in figure 1.19
The supply of foreign financing (OFCA) is (according
to Granger) caused by the world business cycle and the
terms of trade.20 The supply of foreign financing, in
turn, causes capital flows to Chile, and this affects
private domestic spending.21 Lastly, the current account
at trend prices22 is caused by private spending, capital
inflows, and, to a lesser extent, the terms of trade.
2. Effects of the URR on the spread of returns
The unremunerated reserve requirement imposed on
capital inflows sought to raise the cost of using
external financing, in order to partially discourage it
and gain additional room for monetary-policy
manoeuvre. This additional room would be reflected
in the arbitrage conditions and, hence, the spread of
returns or its key domestic components, the domestic
real interest rate or the expected real depreciation. The
financial cost of the URR (CFE) arises from having to
maintain a non-interest bearing foreign-currency
deposit, and its value is determined by the reserve
requirement rate, the maturity of the deposit, the
relevant external interest rate, taxes on intermediation,
and the currency in which the URR is constituted.23
The mechanism acts as a wedge that raises the cost of
obtaining external financing —analogous from a
financial standpoint to a rise in the external interest
rate— by an amount equal to the value of the CFE.
Given the associated higher cost of external financing,
this wedge depreciates the local currency, thus
reducing expectations of future depreciation, or else
makes it possible to raise the domestic interest rate.
Either way, the spread of expected returns widens.
An initial empirical analysis of the effects of the
URR is made by examining its potential impact on the
spread of effective returns and on two key
macroeconomic variables that are closely linked to its
component elements: the real domestic interest rate and
the real exchange rate. The first column of table 3 shows
the results of a simple econometric exercise consisting
of regressing by ordinary least squares (OLS) the actual
spread of asset returns, spread_2, against a variable
representing the supply of external capital (LOFCA, the
logarithm of OFCA) and the financial cost of the URR
(CFE).24 The estimation shows that the CFE resulted in
a widening of spread_2, while the supply of foreign
FIGURE 1
Granger causality diagram a/
(1990.1 to 1997.4)
Source: Authors’ calculations using variables presented in appendix A.
a/
 The arrows indicate the directions of significant Granger causality.
The significance level is also presented.
19
 Appendix C displays causalities and correlations.
20
 The variable that measures the supply of external financing (OFCA),
is defined on the basis of sovereign debt spreads and net capital
flows to the main Latin American countries, excluding Chile. Net
flows to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are added weighted by the
ratio between their own sovereign spread and that of Chile. In this
way, the indicator of the supply of foreign financing to Chile rises if
capital flows to the region increase, or if Chile’s sovereign spread
falls relative to those of other countries in the region.
21
 Econometric estimations recognise a favourable structural break
in the supply of foreign financing as from 1995, likely related to
advances in financial development and openness in Chile, and the
differentiation of Chile from other emerging economies following
the Mexican crisis. This break was reversed from 1998 onwards.
22
 See Guajardo and Le Fort (1999).
23
 The series for the financial cost of the encaje was derived in Le
Fort and Sanhueza (1997). For further details see appendix A.
24
 Appendix D presents the unit root test for the variables considered.
Of the variables included in this relation, the spread and LOFCA appear
not to be integrated of order one. The relation cointegrates according
to the Engle Granger test, Appendix E.
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financing (LOFCA) tended to reduce it. The results are
barely significant.25
The specification shown in the second column of
table 3 is based on the same arbitrage relation, but with
the real domestic interest rate as dependent variable,
and the other components of the Spread (external
interest rate and expectations of real depreciation)
included among the explanatory variables.26 The
instrumental variables method is used considering that
the expected depreciation is an endogenous variable.
The results show that the CFE generates statistically
significant effects on the real interest rate, although the
parameter associated with the real external interest rate
(REXT) and expected real depreciation (EdTCR) appear
as non-significant, and the results are affected by serial
autocorrelation. The CFE generates a positive effect on
the domestic interest rate which is statistically different
from zero at the 99% confidence level, acting in the
opposite direction to the supply of foreign financing
(measured by LOFCA or by DUM98), which significantly
reduces the real domestic interest rate. The variable
DUM98 represents the reversal of capital flows, taking
the value 0 during periods of strong capital inflow and
1 as from 1998, when the sudden stop of flows
occurred.The estimation shown in the third column of
table 3 seeks to measure potential effects of the financial
cost of the reserve requirement on the real exchange
rate. The estimation controls for the supply of external
capital (which, as expected, lowers the real exchange
rate) and for the difference between aggregate demand
and outputs representing the excess demand for goods,
which also tends to depress the real exchange rate. It is
shown that the financial cost of the encaje acts by
TABLE 3
Chile: Effects of the financial cost of the encaje (CFE) on financial
arbitrage variables a/ b/
(1990.1-2000.4)
Variable explained => Spread_2 Rc90 LTCR
Method => OLS c/ 2SLS d/ 2SLS d/
Explanatory variables:
Constant 0.0799 0.1272 4.6409
(0.224) (0.000) (0.000)
CFE +REXT-rc90 – – 2.2624
(–) (–) (0.006)
LDDA-LPIB – – -2.2657
(–) (–) (0.000)
CFE 2.1826 0.5633 –
(0.157) (0.001) (–)
DUM98 – 0.0093 –
(–) (0.011) (–)
EdTCR+REXT – 0.0362 –
(–) (0.420) (–)
LOFCA -0.0163 -0.0121 -0.0360
(0.298) (0,000) (0.019)
Adjusted R2 0.0125 0.821 0.3585
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.133 1.195 1.125
F-statistic 1.272 45.840 11.407
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ Figures in parentheses are P-values.
b/ Instruments: CFE LFIN(-1), LOFCA FKN(-1), GAPHPY(-1), LFBKF(-1), LPIB(-1), LTI TIEMPO DUM98 RC90(-1), LIBO90 SPREAD(-1), LRSTD(-1), LGOB
FKNAY(-1), LTRIB(-1), LTCR(-1), REXT EDTR(-1).
c/ Ordinary least squares.
d/ Two-stage least squares.
25
 The coefficient measuring the effect of the CFE on Spread_2 is
significant only at the 84.5% confidence level, and is not statistically
different from one. This restriction is not rejected by the data at the
10% significance level; value of F-statistic (0.8), value of the
likelihood ratio (0.8).
26
 All the variables included in this relation are integrated of order
one (except LOFCA), and the relation between them cointegrates
according to the Engle Granger test (Appendices D and E).
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compensating one-for-one the negative effect exerted
on the real exchange rate by the difference between the
domestic and external interest rates.27
The results of estimations for the spread and the
real interest rate lend some empirical support for the
idea that the URR was effective in modifying
international interest-rate arbitrage conditions, thereby
giving monetary policy some additional room for
manoeuvre. An initial measurement of this is obtained
as the effect of the CFE at its peak (350 basis points) on
Spread_2. As noted earlier, the estimated parameter is
not statistically different from one, so the additional
margin would be up to 350 basis points, although the
limits of a confidence interval for this are very wide,
given the low significance level of the corresponding
parameter. If room for monetary-policy manoeuvre is
calculated on the basis of the equation presented for
the real interest rate, the financial cost of the encaje at
its peak would have allowed a real domestic interest
rate that was between 90 and 300 basis points higher,
according to a 95% confidence interval. Based on the
equation for the real exchange rate, the maximum level
of the CFE would have allowed monetary policy
flexibility equivalent to a real exchange rate that was
9% more depreciated. To the extent that the encaje
increased the room for monetary-policy manoeuvre, it
had to limit net capital inflows. The following section
presents the results of a simple econometric model to
empirically analyse the effect of the encaje on capital
flows.
III
Empirical model for capital flows
Various studies have considered the effects of the encaje
on capital inflows to Chile. Forbes (2003) presents
information on the microeconomic costs for small firms,
arising from the partial coverage of the deposit
requirement and the fact that exempt capital flows made
it possible to obtain financing under conditions that
essentially favoured larger firms. Several other studies
have measured the macroeconomic effectiveness of
Chile’s URR, but none of them considered the supply of
foreign financing as a relevant factor when analysing
the intensification of capital inflows during the 1990s.
The paper by Valdés and Soto (1996), for example,
concentrates exclusively on short-term flows and shows
that the effect of the reserve requirement on such flows
has been negative but small, while the effect on the real
exchange rate has been nil. Chumacero, Labán and
Larraín (2000) also find a negative effect for the encaje
on short-term flows and a non-significant one on long-
term flows. Soto (1997) reports an effect on capital flows
which is statistically significant but lacking in economic
relevance. Laurens and Cardoso (1998), meanwhile, find
no evidence for any effect on capital flows. Nadal-De
Simone and Sorsa (1999) claim that there is no evidence
yet regarding the effect of the encaje on the Chilean
economy. De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) and
Gallego, Hernández and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002)
highlight the fact that the policy has enabled the Chilean
economy to maintain a higher interest-rate differential
with respect to rates abroad, but the effect of this on the
exchange rate is inconclusive. Nonetheless, it is
acknowledged that the encaje induces a change in the
composition of financing, by increasing the proportion
of medium- and long-term foreign financing.
The results of this paper show that the encaje policy
played a major role in restraining capital inflows into
Chile, particularly short-term flows, during the 1990s.
Unlike earlier papers, the empirical study we present here
aims to describe the effect of the policy on the
macroeconomic framework. The model recognizes the
link between private demand and capital flows, and seeks
to understand the role played by the URR in the behaviour
of these variables in Chile during the 1990s. Unlike the
empirical studies commented on above, the model
presented below includes the supply of foreign financing
as a relevant factor in explaining external capital flows.
In addition to pull factors associated with the demand
for external financing that arise from the current-account
deficit and are driven by domestic demand, the study
takes account of elements that represent the availability
27
 The restriction that the parameter associated with the financial
cost of the encaje is equal to that of the difference between the
external and domestic real interest rates is not rejected by the data
(value of F-statistic: 0.03). This third relation between the arbitrage
variables, the cost of the encaje and variables representing the supply
of capital does not cointegrate (appendix E).
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of external financing, recognizing the structural change
that occurred as from 1998 when capital flows towards
emerging economies in general retreated sharply.
In an earlier paper (Le Fort and Lehmann, 2000) the
authors attempted to measure the effect of the encaje on
gross capital flows, and of these on private expenditure,
in a type of feedback model where the reserve requirement
affects gross capital inflows but not outflows, and net
flows affect aggregate demand. That specification was
developed using balance-of-payments and national-
accounts series with 1986 as the base year, and the results
could not be satisfactorily reapplied using the new series
based on 1996. Using the new macroeconomic data series,
this paper estimates behavioural functions for net capital
flows and the two main components of private-sector
aggregate demand. Causality runs from the encaje to net
flows and then to aggregate demand; but the model also
recognizes the effect of aggregate demand on the demand
for financing and capital flows. The URR is measured by
its financial cost CFE and is considered an exogenous
policy variable, as it seems impossible to adequately
represent the way it was managed during the decade in a
single behavioural function. Moreover, rather than
actively regulating the intensity of the reserve requirement
according to policy goals, the URR policy actions sought
from time to time to compensate for the erosion of its
effectiveness by the redirection of capital inflows to
channels that were exempt.
1. Cointegration of capital flows
Table 4 shows cointegration relations for total net
capital flows, short-term flows, and medium- and long-
term flows, respectively; each of them are estimated
using instrumental variables, since some of the
explanatory variables are endogenous. In general, the
variables are represented in natural logarithm form,
which is indicated by an L preceding the name of the
variable. Exceptions to the use of logarithms were net
capital flows, which change sign in the sample, and
variables expressed in rate form, such as interest rates,
spread and the CFE. The results of these estimations
satisfy the standard conditions of a cointegration
relation, including the requirement that their residuals
be stationary; in each case the unit root hypothesis is
rejected at the 1% significance level.28
The evolution of total net capital flows (FKN) can be
reasonably explained by (i) the supply of foreign
28
 Appendix E presents Engle and Granger unit roots tests for the
residuals of the cointegration relations.
financing, represented by the dummy variable that
measures the reversal of capital flows in Chile as from
1998 (DUM98);29 (ii) the demand for external financing
in the economy, represented by the ratio between domestic
aggregate demand and GDP (LDDA-LPIB) and the terms of
trade (LTI); and (iii) by arbitrage conditions, represented
by the expected spread of returns between domestic and
external assets (spread) and the financial cost of the URR
(CFE). A trend variable is also included to capture the
effects of economic growth, greater international financial
29
 DUM98 is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 at the start of
the sample, and 1 as from the first quarter of 1998, when capital
flows into Chile faltered abruptly. This variable gave better results
than the capital-supply index LOFCA in the equation for total net flows
and short-term flows. Using LOFCA to represent the supply of foreign
financing produces qualitatively very similar results, but with a
weaker fit, as shown in appendix G. LOFCA is a better explanatory
variable for medium- and long-term capital flows.
TABLE 4
Chile: Cointegration estimations for total net
capital flows, short-term flows and medium-
and long-term flows a/ b/
Method: Two-stage least squares (1991.1-2000.4)
Explained Variable FKN FKNCP FKNMYLP
Explanatory variables
Constant 16514.34 18966.37 -15829.91
(0.045) (0.063) (0.097)
LTI -3544.45 -4205.68 -2632.16
(0.054) (0.061) (0.211)
LDDA-LPIB 14644.23 15294.07 –
(0.001) (0.005) (–)
Spread – CFE 6463.43 17917.80 –
(0.059) (0.000) (–)
DUM98 -1508.24 -1031.57 -638.87
(0.002) (0.003) (0.059)
Time 30.39 – –
(0.133) (–) (–)
LOFCA – – 105.5261
(–) (–) (0.303)
LFBKF – – 1977.47
(–) (–) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.143 0.153
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.010 1.303 1.747
F-statistic 7.241 5.029 3.067
Source: Estimations by the authors.
a/ Figures in parentheses correspond to P-values.
b/ Instruments: CFE LFIN(-1), LOFCA FKN(-1), GAPHPY(-1), LFBKF(-1),
LPIB(-1), LTI, TIEMPO, DUM98, RC90(-1), LIBO90, SPREAD(-1), LRSTD
(-1), LGOB, FKNAY(-1), LTRIB(-1), LTCR(-1), REXT, EDTCR(-1).
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integration and worldwide inflation on total net capital
flows that are measured in current United States dollars.
The effects of the demand for external financing and
foreign financing-supply conditions on capital inflows
are statistically different from zero at the 1% significance
level, while the terms of trade and the spread minus the
CFE, are significant at the 6% level.
The individual influence of each variable on capital
flows is affected by the collinearity that exists between
them and by the small size of the sample. In fact, the
encaje was an attempt to compensate for differences
between domestic and external interest rates, and it may
have had some moderating effect on the real
appreciation of the peso, a reason why the CFE can be
seen as compensating for the value of the spread. In
view of the above, the effects of the spread and the CFE
on capital inflows were constrained to be of equal value
but opposite sign. To test the effectiveness of the encaje
on capital flows, the cointegration equation was re-
estimated for total capital flows, with spread and CFE
as independent variables; then the exclusion of the CFE
was rejected at the 5% significance level.30
We should emphasize, however, that the negative
effect of the financial cost of the encaje on FKN depends
critically on including a variable that measures the
supply of foreign financing (DUM98 or LOFCA). If one
ignores the fact that there was an extraordinary increase
in the supply of foreign financing while the URR was in
force, and variables like DUM98 and LOFCA are omitted,
then the encaje appears to be weakly related to capital
flows. Inclusion of variables associated with the effect
of the supply of foreign financing is fully justified given
the nature of the problem under study. Exclusion of
DUM98 and CFE from the FKN equation is clearly
rejected by the data at the 1% level (appendix G, table
G2), as it significantly undermines the explanatory
power of the regression for FKN — the adjusted R2 falls
from 0.44 to 0.14 (appendix G, table G1).
If net capital flows are broken down into their short-
term (FKNCP) and medium- and long-term (FKNMYLP)
components, the estimation of cointegrating relations
for each type of flow shows clearly distinguishable
behaviour patterns. In the estimation of short-term
flows, presented in the second column of table 4, the
response to the encaje is even more pronounced than
in the case of total flows. The coefficient of spread-
CFE in the FKNCP regression is more than double that
corresponding to the estimation of total flows and is
significant at the 1% level.
In the case of medium- and long-term flows
(FKNMYLP), the results for which are shown in the third
column of table 4, neither the effect of the encaje nor
that of the spread was significant. Accordingly, both
variables were omitted, accepting that returns arbitrage
was not a dominant force driving medium- and long-
term net capital flows to Chile in the 1990s. The
evolution of FKNMYLP relates more directly to domestic
investment and the evolution of foreign financing-
supply conditions (LOFCA). It is, therefore, notable that
the effectiveness of the encaje in influencing total
capital flows is fundamentally determined by the
response of short-term flows to the CFE. This confirms
earlier results concerning the effect of the reserve
requirement on the composition of external financing,
namely that it favours a heavier relative use of medium-
and long-term foreign financing, but not that it increased
FKNMYLP.
2. Error-correction model for net capital flows
The short-term adjustment process represented by error-
correction equations is estimated by ordinary least
squares. Contemporary changes in the model’s
endogenous variables are not included, and lagged
variables can be considered exogenous. To denote the
first time-difference of the variable used in the
cointegration estimations, the letter D is placed before
the original name of the variable, and the number of
lags is shown in parentheses.31
The results of the error-correction estimation for total
net capital flows, shown in the first column of table 5,
highlight the rapid and statistically significant error
correction response of net capital flows, that is to the
residual in the cointegration equation for FKN lagged by
one period, RESIDFKN(-1). Total net capital flows also
respond to arbitrage variables and to macroeconomic
variables, including lagged changes in the terms of trade30 In the unrestricted estimation, the parameter associated with CFE
in the cointegration equation for capital inflows was -26,712, and
was significant at the 95% confidence level; whereas the parameter
for spread was 2,505, and not significantly different from zero even
at 25%. An F-statistic of 4.16 is obtained in the equivalence test for
the two configurations that include and exclude the financial cost of
the encaje, which shows that the hypothesis of encaje exclusion is
rejected with 95% confidence.
31
 DX(-i) represents the “i”th lag of the first difference of variable
X. In the case of variables expressed in log form (e.g. LTI), the first
difference of the logarithm is expressed as if it were that of the
original variable (e.g. DTI).
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(DTI), in the demand for external financing represented
by the difference between the changes in aggregate
demand and output (DDDA-DPIB), and in the supply of
external capital (LOFCA). Arbitrage-related variables
include changes in the financial cost of the encaje (DCFE)
and changes in the external 90-day real interest rate
(DREXT), also with different lags. All the parameters
associated with the explanatory variables are statistically
different from zero at 5% significance or less according
to the “t statistic test”. Exclusion of arbitrage-related
variables, DREXT(-4), DCFE(-4) and DCFE(-7), is rejected
by the data, as is the exclusion of the variables related to
the encaje, DCFE(-4) and DCFE(-7).32
The error-correction estimation for short-term
capital flows, shown in the second column of table 5,
provides similar results to the estimation made for total
flows, but the response of short-term flows to the
reserve requirement is more immediate and clearly
stronger than that of total flows. Estimation of the error-
correction model for medium- and long-term flows
provides different results, which are shown in the third
column of table 5. Firstly, the response of such medium-
and long-term flows to the encaje seems to be weak.
Even more, on impact the reserve requirement increases
medium- and long-term flows, many of which were not
covered by the URR and were used as a vehicle for
circumvention. With several quarters’ lag the
circumvention is compensated and the encaje generates
some weak negative effect on medium- and long-term
capital flows.
TABLE 5
Chile: Error-correction estimations for total net capital flows,
short-term flows and medium- and long-term flows a/
Method: Ordinary least squares
(1991.2 - 2000.4)
Variable explained => DFKN DFKNCP DFKNMYLP
Explanatory variables
C -45.540 (0.300) -89.425 (0.342) –
DCFE – -73185 (0.000) 44082 (0.002)
DCFE(-1) – 48807 (0,004) –
DCFE(-4) -17925 (0.029) – -44082 (0.002)
DCFE(-7) -24118 (0.003) – –
DREXT(-5) -18234 (0.002) -34928 (0.002) –
DREXT(-6) – -32400 (0.003) –
DREXT(-1) – – -24663 (0.018)
Drc90(-2)-DREXT(-2) – 21010 (0,000) –
DTI(-3)+DTI(-4) -2287.3 (0.006) -2287.3 (0.006) -2521.6 (0.06)
DTI(-6) -6375.2 (0.000) -4449.8 (0.018) -2521.6 (0.06)
DTI(-7)+DTI(-8) 2890.4 (0.001) – (–)
DLOFCA(-2)+DLOFCA(-4) 51.53 (0.083) – 142.37 (0.010)
DLOFCA(-2)+DLOFCA(-3) – 214.51 (0.001) 142.37 (0.010)
DLOFCA(-8) 108.68 (0.000) 113.57 (0.029) –
DDDA(-4)-DPIB(-4) 11861 (0.000) – –
Dy (-4) 0.19736 (0.004) – –
Dy (-7) + Dy (-8) -0.18124 (0.014) – 0.30663 (0.08)
Drc90(-3)-DCFE(-3) – 24160 (0.000)
RESIDY(-1) -0.80752 (0.000) -0.44856 (0.002) -0.918 (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.934 0.775 0.781
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.995 2.119 2.001
Source: Estimated by the authors.
a/ RESIDY(-1) represents the residuals of cointegration equation y (FKN, FKNCP or FKNMYLP) with a one-period lag, while Dy(-1) is the
corresponding explained variable in the error-correction model, with i lags.
32
 Based on an unrestricted estimation of parameter values presented
in appendix H, table H2.
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The equations for net capital flows discussed in this
section, in conjunction with estimations for gross capital
formation and the rest of private-sector aggregate
demand presented in appendix C, comprise a model
that can be used to evaluate the macroeconomic effects
of the encaje policy. Estimations for the two behavioural
functions representing private expenditure —capital
formation and the rest of private-sector domestic
demand— give conventional results. The only
outstanding feature of those estimations is that private
expenditure responds significantly to net capital flows.
Cumulative annual total net capital flows expressed as
a percentage of GDP (FKNAY) were included as an
explanatory variable in the equations for private
expenditure.
The policy-evaluation simulations use the
cointegration and error-correction relations to represent
the dynamics of the variables. The first of the
simulations was carried out on the basis of departures
from the baseline scenario in order to calculate total
response (multiplier effects) to changes in key variables.
The second simulation was directed to answer whether
or not the application of the encaje in Chile made a
significant contribution to the stabilization of domestic
demand by moderating the expansionary trend of capital
flows; it presents the effects of eliminating the reserve
requirement in 1996, the year in which capital inflows
intensified. Finally, the third simulation attempts to
answer whether a more intensive application of the URR
could have averted the overexpansion of private
expenditure on its own, or whether it would have needed
support from other complementary policies. The
simulation evaluates the policy adjustments that were
needed to reduce aggregate demand by around 1.5% in
1997, in order to limit the economy’s exposure to a
sudden stop of capital flows.
1. Multipliers of key variables
Presented below are the response elasticities for
domestic aggregate demand and net capital flows to
changes in the spread, the CFE, the domestic interest
rate, cumulative annual net capital flows as a percent
of GDP (FKNAY) and government expenditure, sustained
for two years (table 6). The exercise was carried out
considering changes of 100 basis points in the real
domestic interest rate, the spread and the CFE, and
changes equivalent to 1% of GDP in cumulative annual
net capital flows (FKNAY) and total government
expenditure. The results confirm that the effects of
changes in the CFE on aggregate demand and capital
flows are quantitatively important.
Changes in the real interest rate directly affect
private expenditure by altering the cost of domestic
financing for consumption and investment. A sustained
100 basis-point rise in the domestic real interest rate
reduces domestic demand by 1.06% after two years. If
the returns spread were to rise in parallel with the
interest rate, the total effect on aggregate demand would
be moderated, but still be negative. A 100 basis-point
increase in the spread would generate a cumulative
annual increase in net capital flows equivalent to 0.24%
of GDP; the capital inflow, in turn, has an expansionary
effect on private-sector spending, such that a 100-basis
point widening of the spread is associated with a 0.26%
increase in private expenditure after two years. An
increase in the reserve requirement can offset the
spread’s expansionary effect on capital flows and
private expenditure. The 100 basis-point rise in the CFE
—roughly equivalent to a 10 percentage-point rise in
the encaje rate or extending the period of the required
deposit for about four months— causes capital flows
IV
Simulations of policy responses
to confront external capital flows
TABLE 6
Chile: Proportional response of capital flows
and total domestic demand in t+7 to a
sustained change in the explanatory variable
introduced in t
Variation of FKNAY Variation of
(Percentage of GDP) domestic demand (%)
+1% rc90 – -1.06%
+1% spread 0.24% 0.26%
+1% CFE - 0.77% -0.67%
+1% FKNAY 1.00% 0.42%
+1% LGOB 0.00% 0.21%
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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to contract by 0.77% and reduces aggregate demand
by 0.67%. A parallel and equal increase in both the
spread and the CFE ends up reducing capital flows and
aggregate demand, according to the estimation.33 Lastly,
a 1% increase in government expenditure raises
aggregate demand by 0.21%, despite not affecting
capital flows.
2. Encaje, early elimination scenario
To identify the macroeconomic consequences of
discontinuing the URR during the capital flow surge, a
simulation exercise is presented, using the results of
the estimation discussed in the previous section. The
simulation attempts to approximate the behaviour of
net capital flows, gross capital formation and domestic
aggregate demand if the reserve requirement on capital
inflows had been lifted; i.e. if the CFE had been lowered
to zero as from the first quarter of 1995. With the encaje
having no effect, lowering the CFE to zero would not
alter the value of other macroeconomic variables,
particularly capital flows and domestic demand. As
shown in figure 2, the simulation based on the
estimations presented in the previous section neither
shows that the URR was totally ineffective, nor that its
effect on total capital flows and aggregate demand was
irrelevant.
Without the URR, domestic demand would have
expanded even more strongly in 1996 and 1997,
surpassing the baseline scenario by 1.6% of GDP in
1997. As shown in figure 3, abolition of the reserve
requirement in 1995 would have amplified the cycle.
From the third quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of
1998 domestic demand is between one and two
percentage points of baseline GDP higher than in the
baseline scenario. Holding everything else constant, this
additional expenditure would have caused the current
account deficit in 1997 to widen to about 7%, instead
of fluctuating around 5% of GDP as it did that year,
thereby making the economy more vulnerable to a
sudden stop in capital flows.
It can be concluded that although the URR policy
was unable to avoid the overexpansion of private-sector
spending in 1996 and 1997, it still had a significant
macroeconomic effect; in the absence of the URR, the
excess expenditure would have been either considerably
larger, or else required the introduction of other
compensatory measures, such as a much tighter fiscal
policy, simply to keep aggregate expenditure at the
original level.
Figure 4 shows the deviations of total net capital
flows and short-term flows from the baseline scenario
in the no-encaje scenario. The simulation clearly shows
that short-term flows respond more than twice as much
as total flows to the elimination of the reserve
requirement. Short-term capital flows increase by up
to 4.5% of GDP, while total flows expand by 1.5% of
FIGURE 2
Chile: Simulation of encaje elimination,
1995-1997
Cumulative annual net capital flow (FKNAY), as a
percentage of GDP
FIGURE 3




 That is the effect of the CFE on capital flows appears to be larger
than that of the spread. It is important to have in mind that the
underlying assumption in calculating the CFE is that all flows have a
maturity of one year. For shorter maturities, the increase in the URR
has a larger impact on the effective financial cost.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3 47
THE UNREMUNERATED RESERVE REQUIREMENT AND NET CAPITAL FLOWS:  CHILE IN  THE 1990s •  GUILLERMO LE FORT V.
AND SERGIO LEHMANN
GDP, only. The counterpart of this difference would be
a decrease in medium- and long-term flows in response
to abolition of the encaje. This shows the strong effect
of the URR on short-term flows and, consequently, its
effectiveness in shifting the composition of external
financing toward medium- and long-term flows.
Naturally, a different combination of policies than
those actually applied if the encaje had been lifted
completely can be envisaged, but that would have meant
overcoming other problems. If, along with abolition of
the URR the domestic interest rate had been lowered by
an amount equivalent to the CFE reduction, the lower
interest rate could have caused a narrowing of the
spread, which would have at least partly averted the
additional capital inflow stemming from the lower CFE.
Still, for that to happen, it must be assumed that
lowering the domestic interest rate would not have
affected the exchange rate, and the expected real
depreciation, otherwise the spread may have failed to
fall in order to compensate the reduction in the CFE.
But even in this favourable case, the lower cost of
domestic financing associated with the lower real
interest rate would have by itself boosted aggregate
demand, thus aggravating the existing macroeconomic
imbalance.
3. Macroeconomic adjustment scenarios
A second simulation exercise involves applying the
results of the estimation to define policy actions that
would have made it possible to curb spending growth
in 1996 and 1997. A reduction in the level of aggregate
demand equivalent to 1.5% of GDP in 1997 would have
been sufficient to reduce the current account deficit to
around 4% of GDP. Possible ways of achieving this
include hikes in the URR rate and in the interest rates.
In 1996 and 1997, the exchange rate remained close to
the floor of its flotation band, so there was rigidity
preventing the peso from appreciating in response to
contractionary monetary policy. Consequently, an
interest-rate hike in a situation of exchange-rate rigidity
would have widened the expected spread of returns,
and this would have stimulated additional capital
inflows. Nonetheless, lacking an empirical relationship
to explain the behaviour of the spread, for the purposes
of the simulation exercise the CFE rate alone will be
varied, with the spread and the domestic interest rate
left unaltered. A 150 basis-point rise in the financial
cost of the encaje  —achieved, for example, by
extending the term of the special deposit from 12 to 18
months— would have reduced total cumulative annual
capital flows (FKNAY)34 by 1.2% of GDP in 1996, and
by 0.4% in 1997 (figure 5). With net capital flows
declining in response to the higher CFE, aggregate
expenditure would have shrunk, but only by 0.2% of
GDP in 1996 and 0.75% of GDP in 1997. Therefore, a
150 basis-point increase in the CFE would not have been
sufficient to generate the adjustment desired for
aggregate demand, yet consideration of even larger
increases raises problems of effectiveness. The
existence of channels for capital flows that are not
covered by the URR causes medium- and long-term
loans to barely falter in response to increases in the
CFE. Accordingly, once short-term flows converge to
zero as a result of the rise in the financial cost of the
reserve requirement, the marginal effectiveness of the
URR in contracting total net flows and, hence, private
expenditure, becomes exhausted. The reason for this is
that while it is reasonable to expect the encaje to restrain
capital inflows, it cannot be assumed to generate net
short-term capital outflows. As shown in figure 6, in
this scenario with a 150 basis-point rise in the CFE, net
annual short-term capital inflows would have been
negative for much of the 1995-1997 period. This points
to the exhaustion of the encaje mechanism in terms of
additional influence on total flows and private
expenditure.35
FIGURE 4
Chile: Simulation of encaje elimination,
1995-1997. Deviations of capital flows from
baseline scenario
(Cumulative annual deviation, as a percentage of GDP)
Source: Prepared by the authors.
34
 Accumulated annually, such that the representative value for each
year in the figure corresponds to the final quarter of that year.
35
 This argument is analogous to the effect of an increase in customs
tariffs: no matter how high an import duty is set, it will never turn
an import substitute into an exportable good.
48 C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 1  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 3
THE UNREMUNERATED RESERVE REQUIREMENT AND NET CAPITAL FLOWS:  CHILE IN  THE 1990s •  GUILLERMO LE FORT V.
AND SERGIO LEHMANN
The marginal effectiveness of the encaje policy was
seriously restricted by the selectiveness of its application.
To prevent the circumvention that undermined its
effectiveness, it would have been necessary to cover by
the URR exempted flows, including direct commercial
credit (from foreign suppliers or export buyers), and
certain forms of portfolio investment. Nonetheless, the
political feasibility of these type of extension was nil as
it aroused strong resistance in the private sector and
proposals along these lines found virtually no support in
the public sector. The interesting point is that extending
the reserve requirement to capital flows that were not
covered not only would have increased its
macroeconomic effectiveness but also would have
reduced the microeconomic costs stemming mainly from
differential financing costs between agents who could
or could not avoid the URR.36 Unfortunately, it is difficult
to simulate how capital flows would have responded to
an extension of the URR application. It is not enough to
assume that a generalization of the mechanism would
have caused medium- and long-term flows to behave
like short-term flows. By design, the CFE that would have
affected medium- and long-term flows brought within
the coverage of the URR would have been much lower
than the CFE affecting short-term flows. Absent the
possibility of wider URR coverage, the most appropriate
complement for an increase in the CFE to control the
expansion of aggregate demand, would have been to
consider the use of countercyclical fiscal policy. This
type of policy would have consisted in accepting a higher
fiscal balance, even surplus, in periods of rapid expansion
of domestic activity and expenditure, and a lower
balance, even deficit, in periods of slower or non-
expansion of activity. As a result, the expansion of public
expenditure would occur in line with the trend growth
of public revenues rather than following its cyclical
fluctuations.37 For the purposes of simulating
countercyclical fiscal policy, a scenario involving a real
expansion of government spending of 5% per year in
1996-1997 is proposed, instead of the 7% average
expenditure growth actually recorded during those two
years. Complementing that fiscal adjustment with a
higher financial cost of the encaje, it would have been
possible to obtain a reduction in aggregate demand,
compared to the baseline scenario, of 1.0% of GDP in
1996 and 1.8% in 1997 (figure 7). By virtue of this overall
adjustment —encaje and fiscal—, the current account
deficit could have been below 4% of GDP in 1997, thereby
reducing the potential effects of a sudden stop of capital
flows.
FIGURE 6
Chile: Simulation of adjustment scenarios for
short-run flows, 1995-1997; 150 basis-point
rise in the financial cost of the encaje
(Cumulative annual flows, as a percentage of GDP)
FIGURE 5
Chile: Simulation of adjustment scenario for
capital flows; 150 basis-point rise in the
financial cost of the encaje, 1995-1997
(Cumulative annual net capital flows, as a percentage
of GDP)
Source: Prepared by the authors.
36
 Even direct investment was used as a channel for avoiding the
encaje, by disguising flows that actually represented financial or
portfolio investment. Le Fort and Sanhueza (1997) examine evasion
channels and argue in favour of a generalization of the mechanism.
37
 See the analysis of countercyclical fiscal policy in Budnevich
and Le Fort (1997).
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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It should be noted that there was another possible
course of action available to moderate capital inflows,
but, unlike the other alternatives, this required accepting
a greater real currency appreciation. Allowing a larger
real appreciation of the peso would have reduced the
spread of returns by raising expectations of future real
depreciation, thereby reducing capital inflows and
private expenditure. Nonetheless, such a course of
action entails risks that are hard to anticipate. The real
appreciation might not have immediately resulted in
expectations of future depreciation, as assumed
regularly as well as in this model. Under especially
uncertain conditions, a greater appreciation might
encourage expectations of further appreciation, at least
for a while; and this would have caused a profound
misalignment of the exchange rate, with serious effects
on resource allocation and macroeconomic stability.
Apart from the expansionary or contractionary effect
of the variable driving the real appreciation, there is
some empirical evidence that such an appreciation is
associated with an expansion of private spending. The
first reason being that the Chilean private sector has a
net liability position in foreign currency (Chile’s
external debt is held predominantly by the private
sector), the real value of which falls with the real
appreciation; and the second that the vast majority of
consumers are wage-earners whose real income is
essentially a non-tradable good whose relative price
rises with a real appreciation.38
FIGURE 7
Chile: Adjustment scenarios simulation.
Increase in the financial cost of the encaje,
and slower growth in government spending,
1996, 1997 and 1998
Source: Prepared by the authors.
V
Conclusions
The foregoing analysis of the period of heavy capital
inflows into Chile offers a set of lessons concerning
the behaviour of capital flows and their relation to
macroeconomic variables.
Firstly, Chile suffered from the effects of a massive
capital flow surge from 1990 to 1997, and its subsequent
sudden stop as from 1998. The capital inflow surge was
concentrated in medium- and long-term flows, which
was desirable given that these flows are less volatile
and more persistent than short-term flows. But
concentrating external financing in medium- and long-
term flows was not sufficient protection, since it failed
to prevent the sudden stop. This underscores the
importance of total external financing in determining
the likelihood of a reversal of capital inflows.
Secondly, the intensification of medium- and long-
term flows had the characteristics of an exogenous
supply shock rather than an endogenous arbitrage
response to high domestic interest rates. The
intensification is linked particularly to a reduction in
the domestic interest rate and, hence, to a structural
increase in the supply of foreign financing.
Thirdly, only short-term flows appear to be driven
by returns arbitrage and attracted by higher domestic
interest rates than those prevailing abroad. There are signs
that the encaje helped to compensate for this effect, by
allowing additional room for monetary-policy
manoeuvre. In fact, the real domestic interest rate, and
to some extent the actual spread appear to show a certain
positive response to increases in the CFE, and a negative
response to increases in the supply of foreign financing.
38
 It is also possible that the real appreciation would cause income
to be redistributed towards groups with a higher marginal propensity
to consume, thereby resulting in higher private expenditure,
following the well known Diaz Alejandro effect. The real
appreciation would boost real wages and reduce profits. If the
marginal propensity to consume is greater among workers than
among people who receive income from capital, then the real
appreciation is expansionary for consumption.
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Fourthly, the URR was effective in reducing total
net capital flows and in altering their composition in
favour of medium- and long-term flows. The
cointegration and error-correction estimations reveal
statistically significant responses by capital flows to
the CFE when the supply of foreign financing is included
as a determinant of capital flows. Elimination of the
encaje during the surge of capital inflows would have
produced non-negligible macroeconomic effects,
including an increase in net capital flows of roughly
2% of GDP, and a serious worsening of the
overexpansion of private spending that the Chilean
economy was already suffering in the mid-1990s,
involving an additional domestic-demand expansion of
the order of 1.5% of GDP in 1997.
Fifthly, the marginal effectiveness of the encaje
was limited, because there was little potential to
continue reducing the short-term capital inflows on
which the URR selectively acted. In contrast, there was
no limit to greater circumvention through non-covered
medium- and long-term flows, without extending the
scope of URR application to close off exempt channels.
A more effective strategy to control capital inflows and
restrain domestic demand would have required
additional strengthening of the encaje, not only raising
its financial cost, but also expanding its application and
supporting it with a countercyclical fiscal policy.
Sixthly, the effectiveness of the URR in restraining
net capital flows stems from the compensation response
to an intensification of capital inflows arising from an
increase in the supply of foreign financing. If the latter
is not recognized and foreign financing supply variables
are excluded from the specification of the net capital
flow equation, then the encaje has no statistically
significant effect on capital flows. As the capacity of
the model to explain capital flows also deteriorates
sharply, exclusion of the encaje and foreign financing-
supply variables is rejected by the data.
Lastly, the effect of monetary policy on domestic
expenditure could be weakened by capital inflows if
the exchange rate is unable to fluctuate freely in
response to changes in the interest rate. If the currency
cannot appreciate to offset the potential effects of higher
domestic interest rates on the rates spread, additional
capital inflows weaken the effect of contractionary
monetary policy on domestic spending and complicate
efforts to stabilize the exchange rate. Exchange-rate
flotation restores the effectiveness of monetary policy;
nonetheless, in the face of intensifying capital inflows,
as occurred in 1996-1997, allowing the currency to float
could generate a significant risk of exchange-rate
overshooting, with potentially very harmful
repercussions on resource allocation and external
stability.
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basket used to define the central parity exchange rate
(acuerdo). Regulations in force since 1995 have required the
encaje to be established in dollars; so, from that year onward,
the CFE calculated with the Libor in dollars was used (Source:
Le Fort and Sanhueza, 1997).
Domestic interest rate on loans (rc90)
Average interest rate of the banking system for loans
denominated in “Unidades de Fomento” (UF), at 90-365 days.
Source: Central Bank
Nominal external interest rate (libo90 = i*)
Libor in dollars at 90 days. Source: Central Bank
Real external interest rate (rext): rext = i* –π* + ss
Real exchange rate, in logarithm form (LTCR= log TCR)
Source: Central Bank
Dummy variable for reversal of capital flows (DUM98)
Takes the value 0 until the final quarter of 1997, and 1
as from the first quarter of 1998.
Index of the supply of foreign capital, in log form (LOFCA=
log OFCA)
OFCA was constructed as the sum of capital flows
destined for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (according to IFS
capital account figures) weighted by the respective sovereign
spread relative to the spread on Chilean bonds. Prepared by
the authors using data from J.P. Morgan.
Net flow of short-term capital (FKNCP) including errors and
omissions, credit lines, short-term loans and change in
external assets; Net flow of medium- and long-term capital
(FKNMYLP), including direct and portfolio investment and
medium and long-term loans; and Total Net capital flow
(FKN+FKNCP). Source: Balance of Payments, Central Bank.
Cumulative annual net capital flow as a percentage of GDP
(FKNAY)
Source: Prepared by the authors using cumulative annual
FKN data expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Output gap (Gaphpy)
Source: Variable constructed by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott filter to real quarterly GDP, cumulative for the last
four quarters, and expressed in log form. The gap is defined
as filtered GDP minus actual GDP. Quarterly GDP Source,
National Accounts, Central Bank
Depth of the financial system in log form (LFIN)





Spread of expected returns between domestic and foreign
assets
This variable represents the difference between the
expected returns on assets denominated in pesos and those
denominated in dollars. It is calculated using the following
equation:
Spread = r – (i* – π* + ss) – ET ˆCR
where
r : Real 90-365 day lending rate
i* : Libor in dollars
π* : Wholesale price index of the United States, projected
rate of change
ss : Country-risk or Chile’s sovereign spread
ET ˆCR : Expected real depreciation, calculated as the
difference between the effective exchange rate and
the equilibrium rate, according to Soto and Valdés
(1998).
Effective spread of returns between domestic and foreign
assets (spread_2)
Same as the previous variable, except that the differential
here corresponds to the effective return on peso- and dollar-
denominated assets. It is calculated using the effective
forward change of the real exchange rate
Spread_2 = r – (i* – π* + ss) – T ˆCR
T ˆCR : Real effective forward or expected devaluation,
under perfect foresight.
Financial cost of the encaje (CFE)
This variable is calculated assuming a loan with the same
maturity as the required deposit, one year, and using the
following equation:
CFE =     ε (i* + s)
                (l – ε) (l – t)
where
ε : Encaje rate for the period (30%)
i* : One-year Libor
s : Average spread on short-term foreign credits to the
Chilean private sector.
t : Tax on foreign interest payments (4%).
Given that from the date of initial application of the
encaje until December 1994 it was possible to make the
special deposit in the operation’s currency of origin, for that
period the minimum CFE was obtained from those resulting
by calculating the Libor in dollars, deutschmarks and yen,
weighting them according to the weights in the currency
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Euromoney risk index for Chile (IRE)
Index constructed by Euromoney in the range 0-100.
Economic and sociopolitical factors are weighted to determine
the country-risk rating for each economy. The higher the index,
the less risky the country. Source: Euromoney.
Gross domestic product, in log form (LPIB = log PIB)
Source: Central Bank
Domestic aggregate demand in log form (LDDA = log DDA)
Source: Central Bank
Gross fixed capital formation, in log form (LFBKF = log FBKF)
Source: Central Bank
Remainder of domestic aggregate demand, in log form
(LRESTD=log RESTD)
RESTD includes domestic aggregate demand other than
gross capital formation, consumption and inventory
accumulation. RESTD = DDA-FBKF
Source: Central Bank
Index of the terms of trade, in log form (LTI = log TI)
Source: Central Bank.
Government spending, in log form (LGOB=log GOB)
Source: Ministry of Finance
Government expenditure on capital formation (GOBFBK)
Source: Ministry of Finance
Other government expenditure (GOBRST)
Source: Ministry of Finance
Private gross fixed capital formation, in log form
(LFBKPR)
FBKPR = FBKF - GOBFBK.
Remainder of private-sector domestic aggregate demand, in
log form (LRSTPR)
RSTPR = RESTD - GOBRST.
Tax revenue, in log form (LTRIB)
Source: Ministry of Finance
Worldwide GDP growth (gWorld) and United States GDP growth
(gUSA)
Source: Bloomberg
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APPENDIX B
Graphs of the main variables
Figure B1: Spread Figure B2: Spread_2
Figure B3: Financial cost of the encaje Figure B4: rc90
Figure B5: Libo90 Figure B6: REXT
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Figure B7: LTCR Figure B8: Dum98
Figure B9: LOFCA Figure B10: FKN
Figure B11: FKNCP Figure B12: FKNMYLP
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Figure B13: FKNAY Figure B14: LFBKF
Figure B15: LDDA Figure B16: LPIB
Figure B17: GAPHPY Figure B18: LFIN
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Figure B19: LGOB Figure B20: LTRIB
Figure B21: LRSTPR Figure B22: LFBKPR
Source: This set of graphs was prepared by the authors.
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TABLE C1
Chile: Cointegration for private gross fixed
capital formation (LFBKPR) and for other
private aggregate demand (LRSTPR) a/ b/
Method: Two-stage least squares (1990.1 Stet - 2000.4)










GAPHPY c/ -4.4007 -1.1039
(0.000) (0.006)








Adjusted R2 0.954 0.961
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.184 1.693
F-statistic 135.381 243.106
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ Figures in parentheses correspond to P-values.
b/ Instruments: CFE, LFIN(-1), LOFCA, FKN(-1), GAPHPY(-1), LFBKF
(-1,) LPIB(-1), LTI, TIEMPO, DUM98, RC90(-1), LIBO90, SPREAD (-1),
LRSTD(-1), LGOB, FKNAY(-1), LTRIB(-1), LTCR(-1), REXT, EDTCR(-1),
LRSTD(-1), LGOB2, LGOBRST, LGOBFBK .
c/ Defined as the difference between potential GDP represented by a
Hodrick-Prescott filter applied to cumulative annual GDP, and
actual cumulative annual GDP.
d/ See Lehmann (1998).
Fixed capital formation of the private sector (LFBKPR)
is explained by variables relating to the return of investment
projects, such as the terms of trade (LTI) that affect
profitability of export-oriented projects, and the output gap
(GAPHPY), that affect the profitability of projects oriented to
domestic demand. In addition, variables representing the
effect of financing conditions on investment were also
included, such as cumulative annual net capital flow (FKNAY)
and stock market capitalization (LFIN). The availability of
foreign credit (FKNAY) has a positive effect on capital
formation, and this effect becomes more intensive during the
period of weakening capital inflows (DUM98=1), which also
coincides with the period of least exchange-rate intervention
APPENDIX C
Private expenditure estimated equations
and thus more direct association between foreign credit and
domestic spending.
The rest of the private-sector aggregate demand
encompasses consumption and changes in inventories. The
explanatory variables for this equation include a version of
private-sector disposable income (LPIB-LTRIB) and stock market
depth (LFIN), the output gap (GAPHPY) and the real interest rate,
which affects the rest of private demand only in the period of
high availability of external financing (DUM98=0). Estimation
of the error-correction model for private demand is shown in
table C2. The variables considered, including variations in the
interest rate, terms of trade and output gap, all have the expected
signs and are significantly different from zero.
TABLE C2
Chile: Error-correction estimations for fixed
capital formation and the rest of private-
sector domestic demand a/
Method: Ordinary least squares (1991.2 - 2000.4)
Variable explained   => DFBKPR DRSTPR
Explanatory variables
C – 0.01399 (0.014)
DTI(-1)+ DTI(-2) 0.44155 (0.000) –
DTI(-5)+ DTI(-6) 0,15923 (0,055) –
Drc90(-1) + Drc90(-4) -0.76841 (0.000) –
Drc90(-3) + Drc90(-4) – -0.56164 (0.019)
Drc90(-6) + Drc90(-7)
+ ( Drc90(-8) -0.9811 (0,000) –
Drc90(-6) + Drc90(-7) – -0.37952 (0.054)
Drc90(-5) -1.8633 (0.000) –
DDFKNAY(-1)+
DDFKNAY(-2) 0.72855 (0.000) –
DFKNAY(-5) – 0.71187 (0.018)
DDGAPHPY(-1) -6.7357 (0.000) –
DGAPHPY(-1) +
DGAPHPY(-7) -1.3635 (0.114) –
DPIB(-1) – 1.10349 (0.000)
DPIB(-2) – 0.85115 (0.001)
DTRIB(-2) – -0.22269 (0.020)
DDy(-3) -0.35612 (0.000) –
Dy(-1) + Dy(-3) 0.29376 (0.000) –
Dy(-5) + Dy(-6) – -0.31973 (0.003)
Dy(-6) + Dy(-8) 0.07005 (0.096) (0.056)
Dy(-4) – 0.3204
Dy(-1)+Dy(-2) – -0.48674 (0.001)
RESID(-1) -0.72414 (0.000) -0.63242 (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.928 0.781
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.968 2.249
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ Figures in parentheses are P-values. RESID(-1) represents the
residuals of the corresponding cointegration equation, with a one-
period lag. D represents the first difference of the variable and DD
the second difference. Dy (-i) is the explained variable with i lags.
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APPENDIX D
Chile: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test
Variable ADF / EGR Constant Trend Constant and trend
FKN -5.0 a/ Yes No -5.0 a/
dFKN -3.3 b/ Yes No -7.2 a/
LTI -2.1 Yes No -2.8
dTI -8.8 a/ Yes No -8.7 a/
Spread -2.5 Yes No -2.3
dSpread -4.5 a/ Yes No -4.6 a/
Spread_ 2 -6.9 a/ Yes No -7.4 a/
dSpread_ 2 -5.7 a/ Yes No -5.8 a/
CFE -1.6 Yes No -1.6
dCFE -5.3 a/ Yes No -5.2 a/
LTCR -2.1 Yes No -0.7
dLTCR -6.6 a/ Yes No -7.1 a/
RC90 -3.3 Yes No -3.2
DRC90 -5.4 a/ Yes No -4.2 a/
LIBO90 -2.1 Yes No -2.9
dLIBO90 -2.5 b/ No No -2.5
REXT -2.3 Yes No -2.2
dREXT -5.8 a/ No No -5.8 a/
EdTCR -2.7 Yes No -2.7
dEdTCR -7.8 a/ No No -7.7 a/
LFIN -2.0 Yes No -1.1
dFIN -3.0 b/ No No -3.5 a/
LOFCA -6.5 a/ Yes No -6.4 a/
dLOFCA -11.5 a/ No No -11.4 a/
LPIB -2.7 Yes No -2.1
dPIB a/ -1.9 Yes No -2.9
LDDA -0.9 Yes No -1.5
dDDA -6.5 a/ Yes No -6.6 a/
LFBKPR -1.1 Yes No -2.7
dFBKPR -8.0 a/ Yes No -7.9 a/
LRSTPR -2.0 Yes No -1.9
dRSTPR -8.5 a/ Yes No -4.9 a/
FKNCP -4.6 a/ Yes No -4.6 a/
dFKNCP -6.6 a/ Yes No -6.6 a/
FKNMYLP -4.8 a/ Yes No -4.8 a/
dFKNMYLP -12.5 a/ Yes No -12.4 a/
FKNAY -1.9 Yes No -2.2
dFKNAY -4.9 a/ Yes No -5.0 a/
GAPHPY -4.4 a/ Yes No -4.2 a/
dGaphpy -4.5 a/ Yes No -4.4 a/
LTRIB -3.5 b/ Yes No -1.9
dTrib -3.3 b/ Yes No -4.0 a/
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ Rejected at 1%. b/ Rejected at 5%.
a/ Using the Phillips-Perron test, the unit root hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level, whether including a constant and trend, or
a constant alone.
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APPENDIX E
Engle-Granger unit root test for residuals (EGR) a/







RESIDSpread 2 -7.4 a/
RESIDrc90 -4.7 a/
RESIDLTCR -2.0
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ Rejected at 1%. Critical value of EGR: at 1%, -3.73; at 5%, -2.91.
b/ See Enders (1995), p. 383.
APPENDIX F
Chile: Variables characterization matrix a/
(1990.1 - 1997.4)
World growth Supply of capital Capital inflows Price of copper Terms of trade Trend current a/c
World growth 2.15/0.91 0.26 0.23 0.5 0.52 0.057
Supply of capital 0 68.62/70.7 0.02 -0.03 0.24 -0.35
Net flows 2 ==> 1 0 0.24/0.05 0.25 0.16 -0.345
Price of copper 0 0 0 106.21/22.76 0.85 -0.014
Terms of trade 0 1 ==> 2 0 2 ==> 1 125.27/11.48 -0.089
Trend current a/c 0 0 2 ==> 1 0 0 0.76/0.88
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ The diagonal contains the mean and standard deviation of each variable. The cells above the diagonal show the correlation coefficient
between the variables. The cells below the diagonal indicate the result of the Granger causality test. Identifier numeral “1” refers to the
variable that appears in the corresponding row, and “2” to the variable in the column.
The results show that world growth causes net capital
flows to Chile; the terms of trade cause the supply of capital;
and capital inflows cause the trend current account (or
expenditure). The supply of capital responds positively to
the terms of trade, but not to the copper price.
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Chile: Cointegration of total net capital flows a/ b/
(Alternative specifications)
Method: Two-stage least squares (1991.1 - 2000.4)
Variable explained FKN FKN FKN FKN FKN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Explanatory variables
Constant 13104.97 9336.26 13616.61 8263.05 7795.05
(0.101) (0.161) (0.107) (0.384) (0.377)
LTI -2671.56 -1819.65 -3102.50 -1554.11 -1433.58
(0.139) (0.220) (0.108) (0.489) (0.464)
LDDA-LPIB 16503.11 13788.89 16457.78 17725.94 18099.08
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Spread 2920.02 – 3233.07 4285.85 3987.97
(0.443) (–) (0.419) (0.355) (0.333)
Spread_2 – -360.21 – – –
(–) (0.720) (–) (–) (–)
CFE -26282.12 -26811.84 -26927.32 2011.64 –
(0.054) (0.024) (0.067) (0.881) (–)
DUM98 -1887.17 -1932.33 – – –
(0.000) (0.000) (–) (–) (–)
LOFCA (1-DUM98) – – 378.53 – –
(–) (–) (0.002) (–) (–)
Time 33.45 35.58 22.71 -24.05 -25.31
(0.085) (0.060) (0.225) (0.103) (0.034)
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.486 0.358 0.135 0.159
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.200 2.269 2.072 1.699 1.681
F-statistic 7.238 7.389 6.232 3.789 4.866
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ Figures in parentheses are P-variables.
b/ Instruments: CFE, LFIN(-1), LOFCA, FKN(-1), GAPHPY(-1), LFBKF(-1), LPIB(-1), LTI, TIME, DUM98, RC90(-1), LIBO90, SPREAD(-1), LRSTD(-1),
LGOB, FKNAY(-1), LTRIB(-1), LTCR(-1), REXT, EDTCR(-1).
Each of the five specifications reports a negative and
statistically significant effect for the CFE on total net capital
flows. The only exception is when variables representing the
supply of foreign financing are excluded from the
specification.
In addition to the five alternative specifications, we
present the results of the coefficient restriction test. In the
first case the effect of the spread is restricted to be equal to
that of the CFE, but with opposite sign. The test is applied to
specification (1), which is an unrestricted version of the
cointegration equation for the FKNs used in this paper; the
restriction is not rejected by the data at the 10% significance
level. The test of CFE exclusion applied to specification (1) is
also rejected by the data, this time at the 5% significance
level, along with the test for exclusion of CFE and DUM98,
which is rejected at the 1% level.
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TABLE G2
Variable restriction and exclusion tests in the cointegration
of total net capital flows
Wald test:
Equation EQFKN
Statistical test Value df Probability
F-statistic 2.406231 (1, 33) 0.1304
Chi-squared 2.406231 1 0.1209
Summary of null hypothesis:
Normalized restriction (= 0) Value Standard error
C(4) + C(5) -23362.10 15060.63
Redundant variables: CFE
F-statistic 4.160857 Probability 0.049440
Dependent variable: FKN
Method: Two-stage least squares
Sample: 1991.1 2000.4
Number of observations: 40
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability
C 15881.50 8179.707 1.941573 0.0605
LDDA-LPIB 13412.14 4091.269 3.278235 0.0024
LTI -3426.204 1837.548 -1.864552 0.0709
SPREAD 5919.967 3844.308 1.539931 0.1328
DUM98 -1350.852 425.1714 -3.177193 0.0032
TIME 28.58302 19.70826 1.450306 0.1561
R2 0.436849 Mean of dependent variable 724.1099
Adjusted R2 0.354033 Standard deviation of dependent variable 758.3639
Standard error of the regression 609.5127 Sum of the squares of the residuals 12.631.195
F-statistic 6.935445 Durbin-Watson statistic 2.109922
Probability (F-Statistic) 0.000147
Redundant variables: CFE, DUM98
F-statistic 7.782162 Probability 0.001703
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability
C 7609.241 8822.429 0.862488 0.3943
LDDA-LPIB 17984.64 4357.349 4.127427 0.0002
LTI -1391.464 1959.591 -0.710079 0.4824
SPREAD 3807.827 4307.973 0.883902 0.3828
TIME -25.22153 11.47011 -2.198891 0.0346
R2 0.249573 Mean of dependent variable 724.1099
Adjusted R2 0.163810 Standard deviation of dependent variable 758.3639
Standard error of the regression 693.4739 Sum of the squares of the residuals 16.831.710
F-statistic 4.747603 Durbin-Watson statistic 1.681684
Probability (F-statistic) 0.003633
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Specification (1) presents an alternative version of the
error-correction model associated with the cointegration
relation for selected FKNs. The second column presents an
error-correction model based on alternative specification (4)
for FKN cointegration, using the observed spread (Spread _2)
instead of the expected spread. The third is based on the
cointegration specification for FKN (5) which uses LOFCA
instead of DUM98 to represent the supply of capital.
APPENDIX H
Error-correction model: Total net capital flows
TABLE H1
Chile: Alternative specifications
Method: Ordinary least squares (1991.2 - 2000.4)
Variable explained DFKN DFKN DFKN
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory variables
DCFE(-4) -20628.87 -20547.31 -21714.33
(0.114) (0.016) (0.007)
DREXT(-4) -20796.53 -20547.31 -21714.33
(0.014) (0.016) (0.007)
DSPREAD(-3) 4311.87 – 6891.60
(0.011) (–) (0.007)
DTI(-3)+DTI(-4) -2837.73 -2714.69 -4226.93
(0.024) (0.054) (0.003)
DLOFCA(-2)+DLOFCA(-4) 51.44 72.39 71.69
(0.100) (0.037) (0.026)
DDDA(-4)-DPIB(-4) 9674.33 9556.90 11302.25
(0.0003) (0.002) (0.000)
DFKN(-4) 0.35347 0.289513 0.37741
(0.0015) (0.008) (0.000)
RESIDY(-1) -0.80899 -0.77950 -0.63882
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.788 0.718 0.751
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.081 2.186 2.246
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a/ Figures in parentheses are P-values. RESIDY(-1) represents the residuals from the corresponding cointegration equation, with a one-period
lag.
The first restriction consists of excluding all arbitrage-
related variables from the selected error-correction model.
This restriction is rejected at the 1% significance level,
according to F-tests and the likelihood ratio. The second
restriction excludes only variables associated with the encaje;
in this case the restriction is also rejected at the 1% level,
according to the F-test and the likelihood ratio.
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TABLE H2
Test of restrictions in the error-correction model for FKN
Redundant variables: DCFE(-4), DCFE(-7), DREXT(-5)
F-statistic 12.55910 Probability 0.000046




Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability
C -14.07508 64.33351 -0.218783 0.8285
DTI(-3)+DTI(-4) -1372.601 1104.481 -1.242757 0.2250
DTI(-6) -5480.374 1309.262 -4.185850 0.0003
DTI(-7)+DTI(-8) 3100.855 1130.278 2.743444 0.0109
DLOFCA(-2)+DLOFCA(-4) 64.93306 26.13234 2.484778 0.0197
DLOFCA(-8) 71.60060 39.47195 1.813961 0.0812
DDDA(-4)-DPIB(-4) 10852.28 2684.125 4.043136 0.0004
DFKN(-4) 0.304481 0.083557 3.643988 0.0012
DFKN(-7)+DFKN(-8) -0.156841 0.097817 -1.603423 0.1209
RESIDFKN(-1) -0.828273 0.146451 -5.655622 0.0000
R2 0.885404 Mean of dependent variable -15.16610
Adjusted R2 0.845736 Standard deviation of dependent variable 972.2218
Standard error of the regression 381.8540 Akaike information criterion 14.95809
Sum of the squares of the residuals 3.791.125 Schwarz criterion 15.39795
Log likelihood -259.2456 F-statistic 22.32045
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.912767 Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000
Redundant variables: DCFE(-4), DCFE(-7)
F-statistic 8.064264 Probability 0.002219




Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability
C -52.82989 53.71039 -0.983606 0.3347
DREXT(-5) -23913.63 6444.825 -3.710517 0.0010
DTI(-3)+DTI(-4) -1482.778 904.9873 -1.638451 0.1139
DTI(-6) -5957.520 1079.886 -5.516802 0.0000
DTI(-7)+DTI(-8) 2302.837 950.2834 2.423316 0.0230
DLOFCA(-2)+DLOFCA(-4) 51.37420 21.71047 2.366334 0.0260
DLOFCA(-8) 88.04781 32.62752 2.698575 0.0123
DDDA(-4)-DPIB(-4) 10517.75 2199.977 4.780848 0.0001
DFKN(-4) 0.287082 0.068588 4.185573 0.0003
DFKN(-7)+DFKN(-8) -0.202594 0.081049 -2.499642 0.0194
RESIDFKN(-1) -0.927187 0.122861 -7.546624 0.0000
R2 0.926101 Mean of dependent variable -15.16610
Adjusted R2 0.896542 Standard deviation of dependent variable 972.2218
Standard error of the regression 312.7143 Akaike information criterion 14.57492
Sum of the squares of the residuals 2444755 Schwarz criterion 15.05878
Log likelihood -251.3486 F-statistic 31.33011
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.156734 Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000
